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Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for 
Conflict Management. By Benjamin Reilly. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 232p. $60.00 cloth, 
$22.00 paper. 
Shaheen Mozaffar, Bridgewater State College 
Benjamin Reilly makes an important contribution to the 
debate on the appropriate institutional design of electoral 
systems for mitigating conflict and sustaining democracy in 
ethnically plural societies. The dominant position in this de- 
bate posits the importance of proportional representation 
(PR) systems. An alternative position, less widely accepted 
largely because of an ostensible absence of empirical exam- 
ples, posits the importance of majoritarian preferential sys- 
tems that encourage cross-ethnic vote pooling. Reilly extends 
this debate by drawing on heretofore unknown or understud- 
ied cases to examine the operation of both majoritarian (the 
alternative vote or AV and the supplementary vote or SV) and 
proportional (single-transferable vote or STV) preferential 
systems in different social contexts and in different elections 
(legislative and presidential). 
The book's central argument is that, unlike the elite-based 
PR systems, preferential systems privilege the decisions of 
voters as the source of cross-ethnic vote swapping, forcing 
otherwise rational candidates to forgo ethnic outbidding in 
favor of seeking votes across ethnic cleavages. The argument 
turns on the notion of "centripetalism," which, for Reilly, 
refers to a "normative theory of institutional design" that 
seeks to 1) create electoral incentives for politicians to cam- 
paign for votes across ethnic cleavages, 2) establish arenas 
of bargaining for ethnic elites to transfer the lessons from 
electoral bargains to other political issues, and 3) foster cen- 
trist and aggregative multiethnic political parties instead of 
extremist and exclusively ethnic ones (p. 11). 
Eschewing systematic theory testing, Reilly uses this nor- 
mative theory as a loose framework to evaluate the perfor- 
mance of preferential systems in all cases (except Malta) that 
are known to have utilized them. Bracketing the case studies 
are an informative overview of the development of prefer- 
ential voting systems from their origins in attempts in the 
nineteenth century to overcome the intrinsic weaknesses of 
majority runoff elections (Chapter 2) and a useful discussion 
of the technical variations in the institutional designs of such 
systems that also highlights the unexpected consequences 
of minor technical modifications in institutional design 
(Chapter 7). 
The book's initial focus on Australia is useful, and not only 
because it has developed and refined all variants of preferen- 
tial systems in national and subnational elections for almost a 
century. As an ethnically diverse but not an ethnically divided 
society (p. 25), it also serves as a controlled case for illustrat- 
ing the advantages of preferential systems in achieving the 
three centripetal objectives. The fascinating case of Papua 
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a decline in civic activism, and a breakdown of the social- 
support mechanisms that had been one of the strengths of 
the Soviet system. 
The blame for this turn of events is placed primarily 
on Yeltsin and his chief political and economic advisers. 
Western leaders, the International Monetary Fund, and par- 
ticularly Western economists are also accused of encourag- 
ing Russian leaders to follow an inhumane set of policies. 
The overall reform strategy, generally in line with what 
has come to be known as the Washington Consensus or 
"shock therapy," emphasized monetarist approaches, price 
deregulation, rapid privatization of industry, and the end of 
government-provided subsidies and social safety nets. One of 
the most important contributions of the book is its explication 
of the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that produced 
the reform strategy. Especially useful are the insights on the 
various protoparties and political movements that struggled 
to establish a political foothold in the chaotic developments of 
the period. Reddaway and Glinski coin the term "market bol- 
shevism" to describe the political mindset of the winners-the 
political figures such as Anatoly Chubais who implemented 
shock therapy-a disregard for public opinion and a manip- 
ulative approach that manufactured mass support only when 
absolutely necessary, as during Yeltsin's bid for reelection in 
1996. 
This is a book that provides an overabundance of detail, and 
almost no evidence relevant to its main thesis is overlooked. 
Some of the evidence that contradicts the thesis is perhaps 
dismissed too readily, however. The authors view the period 
of shock therapy as having lasted seven years, rejecting ar- 
guments by reform defenders that the Yeltsin government 
quickly backtracked and that compromises made because 
of political weakness undermined the foundations of many 
of the reforms. Instead, Reddaway and Glinski present this 
"seesaw" approach as the intended strategy. Further, a num- 
ber of phenomena-such as the rise of criminal mafias-that 
were presumably unanticipated consequences of the policy 
choices made are presented as if they were part and parcel of 
the reformers' strategy. 
The authors present alternative paths as real options, al- 
though they seem beyond what was possible in Russia at the 
end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s. Popular discontent- 
a "grassroots anti-nomenklatura upsurge" (p. 253)-that sup- 
posedly could have been mobilized into a movement in 
support of another kind of reform did not appear to have 
the kind of usable potential that the authors suggest. In 
order to tap this presumed source of support, the authors 
argue that Yeltsin should have relied more on the nascent 
democratic movement. In particular, they favor the national- 
democratic wing, such political figures as Sergei Baburin 
and Oleg Rumiantsev. In the early 1990s, these figures were 
marginalized politically, and they joined the opposition that 
conspired to seize power in October 1993. Reddaway and 
Glinski also side with opposition economists such as Sergei 
Glaziev, who has long advocated an economic strategy based 
on government support of key industries and strong social 
programs for the victims of reforms. 
There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the analysis 
to relay as evidence conjecture and conspiracy theories that 
figure so prominently in the Russian media. For example, the 
shortages of consumer goods in the late Soviet period are 
viewed not as evidence of the collapse of the previous system 
but as a pressure tactic by wholesale traders to wrest control 
from the state over this sector. In discussing the events of 
October 1993, when the anti-Yeltsin opposition in parliament 
launched a violent attempt to seize the mayor's office, tele- 
vision facilities, and other centers of power, the authors use 
speculative and dubious accounts to suggest that the violence 
was deliberately facilitated by Yeltsin's security forces. The 
goal was to justify the later use of tanks against the parliament 
in support of Yeltsin's ultimate purpose, "the destruction of 
Russia's parliamentarism for the sake of increasing his per- 
sonal power" (p. 429). The authors find it plausible that the 
1999 incursion by Chechen rebels in Dagestan was provoked 
by the Russian security forces (headed at the time by Vladimir 
Putin) in order to provide an excuse to start a new war in 
Chechnya. 
Overall, though, despite its weaknesses and occasional 
lapses, Reddaway and Glinski's account provides an extraor- 
dinary wealth of information on the twists and turns of 
Russian politics during this formative period. 
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Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, 
Food. By Michael G. Schatzberg. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001. 292p. $49.95 cloth, $22.95 paper. 
Robert Fatton, Jr., University of Virginia 
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa is an insightful, refresh- 
ing, and original book that refines and expands our under- 
standing of the so-called "politics of the belly." A phrase 
made famous by Jean Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: 
The Politics of the Belly, 1993), the politics of the belly is the 
phenomenon of "eating" the fruits of power. The extent to 
which officeholders monopolize or share these fruits with the 
larger community has, however, significant consequences for 
their legitimacy. As Michael Schatzberg suggests, a "moral 
matrix of legitimate governance" (p. 35) embedded in fa- 
milial and paternal metaphors shapes these belly politics. 
In turn, he argues that the moral matrix is rooted in four 
major premises. The first and second are related to the im- 
age of the ruler as a "fatherchief," who has the obligation, 
on the one hand, to nurture and nourish his "family," and 
on the other hand, to punish his "children" when necessary 
and pardon them when they truly repent. The third premise 
concerns the status of women in society; while they are not 
considered equal to men, rulers should, nonetheless, respect 
their role as "counselors and advisers." The fourth premise 
"holds that permanent power is illegitimate and that political 
fathers... have to let their children grow up, mature, take on 
ever-increasing responsibilities in the conduct of their own 
affairs, and eventually succeed them in power" (p. 192). 
Governments that respect these four moral premises are 
not necessarily democratic, but they enjoy legitimacy and 
thus will endure; neither the ballot nor the bullet is likely to 
overthrow them. When the "father-chief" "eats" within limits 
and guarantees his "family" access to food, while both know- 
ing that his power is not eternal and listening to his "wives" 
and "daughters," he will win popular support. To that extent, 
Africans will be satisfied with a regime that responds to their 
own norms of accountability and legitimacy. These norms cor- 
respond to what Schatzberg calls "thinkability." Thinkability 
is not simply "that which is politically thinkable" but is also, 
in Schatzberg's eyes, legitimacy itself. Moreover, the author 
contends, legitimacy can be apprehended through an exhaus- 
tive study of the "mainstream political discourse" (p. 32). 
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa seeks to uncover this 
discourse by systematically examining daily state newspapers, 
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New Guinea provides the clearest and strongest support for 
AV. One of the world's most ethnically fragmented soci- 
eties, Papua New Guinea used AV in three elections between 
1964 and 1972 to mitigate conflicts through cross-ethnic vote 
swapping negotiated by candidates who campaigned together 
among each other's ethnic groups, seeking second-preference 
votes on the correct calculation that rational voters would 
give their first preference to candidates from their own eth- 
nic groups. The adoption of "first past the post" (FPTP) after 
independence in 1975 reinforced the advantage of AV, as the 
new FPTP system created severe cross-ethnic coordination 
problems, encouraging the entry of large numbers of candi- 
dates, with corresponding decline in winning vote ratios and 
increase in election-induced ethnic violence. The 1998 assem- 
bly election in Northern Ireland, held under the terms of the 
Good Friday Agreement, provides the clearest and strongest 
support for STV. In that election, STV helped, through vote 
transfers, to neutralize extremist sectarian parties and elect 
pro-agreement, centrist parties from each side of the other- 
wise deeply divided ethnic cleavages. 
Fiji and Sri Lanka, however, provide weak support for the 
claimed effectiveness of preferential designs. In Fiji, where 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have roughly equal pop- 
ulation ratios but are otherwise ethnically, economically, 
and politically divided, the use of a partially engineered 
AV system in one parliamentary election produced limited 
preelectoral cross-ethnic vote-swapping agreements among 
erstwhile "monoethnic" parties. But the election results un- 
dercut even these limited agreements. In Sri Lanka, the use of 
SV in four presidential elections between 1982 and 1999 failed 
to counteract the overwhelming Sinhalese population advan- 
tage (74%) over Tamils (18%) and Muslims (7%), leading 
always to the election of Sinhalese candidates by an absolute 
majority of first-preference votes. A number of factors related 
to contextual variations and technical modifications in insti- 
tutional design are adduced in an ad hoc manner to account 
for these differences between institutional expectations and 
electoral outcomes. 
Beyond these major cases, the book also contains brief, 
informative discussions of the failed attempts to adopt AV in 
the United Kingdom, the one-time use of STV in Estonia's 
transitional election in 1990, the potential advantage of AV 
in the election of Bosnia-Herzegovina's tripartite presidency 
(an option that was considered but not implemented for the 
presidential elections there in October 2002), and the use of 
various preferential systems in several subnational elections 
in the United States and Canada. 
The book does not systematically account for the mixed 
results from the major cases, exposing the analytical weak- 
ness of the "electoral engineering" approach. For instance, 
perhaps the most important insight of the book, which is 
found only in the last few pages (pp. 185-192), concerns the 
significance of two aspects of ethnic group demographics-- 
fragmentation and concentration-in mediating the expected 
impact of preferential designs. With respect to fragmenta- 
tion, ethnically heterogeneous districts are considered to be 
"the single most important demographic precondition for 
centripetal strategies to work effectively" (p. 185). Group 
concentration, on the other hand, creates ethnically homo- 
geneous electoral districts, rendering the use of vote pooling 
highly problematic. 
Reilly wisely uses these demographic variations to cau- 
tion against a cookie-cutter approach to electoral engineer- 
ing. Curiously, however, he does not systematically examine 
the implications of these variations in the case studies, even 
though ethnically heterogeneous districts are commonplace 
in Papua New Guinea and ethnically concentrated districts 
presumably exist in Northern Ireland, the two cases that pro- 
vide unambiguous support for preferential systems. Also left 
unexamined is the failure of AV to produce the expected re- 
sults in Fiji, where the ethnic group demographic (dispersion 
and geographic intermixing) is also considered favorable for 
the effectiveness of the design (p. 187). Examination of these 
issues requires a more rigorous analytical approach than al- 
lowed by the normative electoral engineering approach. It 
especially requires the use of quantitative techniques such as 
regression analysis to clarify the independent, additive, and 
interactive effects of institutional design and context on elec- 
toral outcomes. The two approaches, however, are not mutu- 
ally exclusive. Quantitative analysis provides the systematic 
knowledge and understanding of the relative effects of insti- 
tution and context that are necessary for realizing the pre- 
scriptive aspirations of the electoral engineering approach. 
Reilly's book, therefore, does not close the debate on 
the appropriate institutional design of electoral systems for 
managing ethnic conflicts. But its coherent and convincing 
arguments in favor of preferential systems, and especially 
its coverage of heretofore unfamiliar and understudied cases 
that have employed them, advance and enrich it. 
